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Description
The Eurozone crisis has pushed reform of the European Union (EU) to the  forefront 
of political debate. How can a Union of 28 states with a population of over half a 
billion be reformed to weather future economic crises and political challenges? 
Finding an answer to this question is extremely difficult not only because current 
reform proposals are so varied, but even more so because we lack insights into the 
preferences for reform amongst national elites and  publics. Although EU support 
has interested scholars for over three decades now, we  virtually know nothing 
about public support for EU reform. Current  research  focuses  almost exclusively 
on the causes of support for the current project and fails to provide a sufficient 
basis for effective reform decisions. Surely, the  feasibility and sustainability of 
EU reform crucially hinges on the support amongst  national publics. eupinions 
examines public support for EU reform by developing a theoretical model and 
employing cutting-edge data collection techniques. Our findings will aid policy 
makers to craft EU reform proposals that can secure widespread public support.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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Executive Summary
A s the new European Commission prepares to take office, it faces a con-siderable challenge. The Commission must prove itself capable of tackling pressing political issues, such as climate change, slowing economic growth, migration and challenges to the rule of law while exercising 
caution in balancing the interests of the various political forces that now make up 
the European Parliament and which influence the member states of the European 
Council. The Commission also needs to be responsive to citizens’ concerns at a 
time when expectations about what European politics needs to deliver are run-
ning high but public confidence in politicians’ capacity to deliver is running low. 
Against this backdrop, it is crucial to understand what Europeans want from the 
new Commission. What do European citizens think are the most important issues 
for the Commission to protect? And what do they worry about most when it comes 
to their personal lives? These are some of the questions we tackle in this report. 
We present evidence based on a survey conducted in early June 2019 in which we 
polled more than 12,000 citizens across the EU. We present two sets of evidence; 
one is based on a sample capturing public opinion in the EU27 (excluding the 
United Kingdom), and the other that focuses on respondents from six member 
states: France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and Spain. We also take 
a closer look at responses in terms of different age cohorts and party support. In 
sum, there are five key findings.
• Within the EU27, the respondents stated that the environment is the EU’s 
key priority for the future (40%). For them, the second most important 
issue is jobs (34%), followed by social security (23%), citizen rights (21%) 
and public safety (19%). While the environment is a key priority in France, 
Germany, the Netherlands and Poland, it is not considered the top priority 
in Italy and Spain. Within the EU27, young respondents between 16 and 
25 years of age also care mainly about the environment (47%) but also about 
equal opportunities (20%).
• Within the EU27, some 51% of respondents identified rising living costs as 
the issue that worries them most. Poor health (28%), job insecurity (25%) 
and crime (21%) also feature high on people’s list of personal worries. While 
rising living costs is the key concern in the six countries subject to an in-
depth examination, French and Polish respondents (61% and 62%) stand 
out in this regard. Interestingly, German respondents express a particular 
concern about political radicalism. A comparison of concerns collated by age 
difference shows that young adults across the EU27 are much more con-
cerned about loneliness than their older counterparts.
• The results suggest that within the EU27, people are quite supportive of the 
EU. In fact, 54% of the respondents expressed support for a deepening of 
European political and economic integration, 62% said they would speak 
positively about the EU in conversations with friends, and 50% express 
optimism about the future of the EU. There are interesting differences across 
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countries: Italian respondents, for example, express a greater desire for a 
considerable deepening of European integration but are least likely to speak 
positively about the EU in conversation with a friend. There are also genera-
tional differences to be noted. Whereas the youngest cohort (16-25 year-olds) 
of respondents express the greatest support regarding EU integration, those 
aged 46 to 55 are most skeptical about it.
• When asked about the likely future evolution of the EU, 35% of respondents 
within the EU27 said that more exits like that of the UK are likely, while 
31% of respondents expect to see different speeds of integration. Some 20% 
of respondents stated that they believe things will remain the same, while 
9% stated that the EU will not exist in the future, and 5% think that there 
will be a United States of Europe at some point in the future. France shows 
the highest percentage (42%) of those who expect to see more attempts to 
exit the EU, while Spain shows the lowest in this regard (28%). Respond-
ents in Germany are much more likely to think that we will see an EU with 
different speeds of integration in the future.
• A closer look at the views of respondents who support fringe parties shows 
that unlike the general public, this cohort is less likely to view the envi-
ronment as a key priority and prefer an emphasis on jobs. This cohort is 
also much more skeptical toward the EU than is the broader public. This is 
particularly true of those who support right-wing parties.
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Introduction
O n the 16th of July 2019, the European Parliament elected Ursula von der Leyen as the new president of the European Commission, placing in her hands the reins of Europe’s executive institution for the next five years. Von der Leyen, whose candidacy had been marked by contro-
versy because she was not one of the candidates (Spitzenkandidaten) earmarked 
by political groups within the European Parliament, became the compromise 
candidate in a period of growing political fault lines among member states. Since 
neither the political groups in the European Parliament nor the European heads 
of government in the European Council managed to agree on one of the two top 
candidates – the Christian Democrat/Conservative Manfred Weber or the Social 
Democrat Frans Timmermans – the European Council settled on von der Leyen 
instead, which embodied a middle ground in their eyes. 
This in turn led to the break with the Spitzenkandidaten process, according to 
which the top candidate of the largest political group in the European Parliament 
would become the natural candidate for the post of President of the European 
Commission. Many members of the European Parliament took this as a provocation. 
In the first press conference following her election, von der Leyen expressed her 
empathy for Parliament’s concerns regarding the break with the procedure while 
emphasizing the need to work with the different political groups in Parliament 
in formulating the Commission’s policy program.1 In the speech ahead of her 
election, she outlined an ambitious policy agenda for the new Commission that 
involved everything from formulating a new Green Deal to promoting a more 
Social Europe to creating a European Defence Union. Her speech was designed to 
give expression to the spectrum of political voices that now make up the European 
Parliament. Next to the Conservatives and Social Democrats, the Liberal and 
Green party groups had become forces to reckon with politically, as well as the 
euroskeptics. Threading these different viewpoints together into one European 
vision will be a challenge for the new Commission president.
Indeed, during her coming term of office, von der Leyen will have to find 
answers to several policy questions, ranging from migrant quotas, to monetary 
union reform to geopolitical challenges. A great deal of diplomatic effort will be 
required to reconcile the widely differing positions of member states. Ultimately, 
the new Commission will have to strike a careful balance in accommodating the 
different member state interests, varying positions of European parliamentary 
groups and remain close to the needs and wants of European citizens.
In her speech on the 16th of July, von der Leyen stresses that European citizens 
“want to see that we [the EU] can deliver and move forward.”2 This statement echoes 
a finding that we’ve highlighted in our eupinions reports since publishing our first 
report What Do the People Want? in September 2015: people want the EU to get things 
1 European Commission Youtube Channel www.youtube.com/watch (accessed August 2019).
2 europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-19-4230_en.htm (accessed August 2019).
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done. While the majority of people support the idea of a united Europe, they are 
increasingly wary about its current direction. Also, in our report Supportive but 
Wary: How Europeans feel about the EU 60 year after the Treaty of Rome from March 
2017, our survey results indicate that support for the general policy direction in 
the EU is much lower than support for membership and further integration. 
Finally, we collect and publish data four times a year on the attitudes of Europeans 
regarding national as well as European politics.3 Over the years, we’ve noticed a 
consistent pattern that stands out: When it comes to the guiding principles and 
potential of European politics, Europeans remain supportive. However, when 
asked about the current state of affairs and what they think the future holds, they 
become less positive. The message delivered by our survey data and trending data 
is clear: people want the EU to deliver the policies they care about. They prefer 
functionality over dysfunctionality and cooperation over conflict.
Against this backdrop, it seems crucial to understand what people want from 
the new European Commission. What are the main priorities they feel the new 
European Commission should focus on? And what are the issues that people are 
worried about when it comes to their own lives? These are the questions we address 
in this report. We present evidence based on a survey conducted in June 2019 in 
which we asked over 12,000 citizens across the EU what they think the EU should 
set as policy priorities and which things worry them most with regards to their 
own lives. We present two sets of evidence; one is based on a sample capturing 
public opinion in the EU27 (excluding the United Kingdom), and the other takes 
a closer look at these issues by focusing more in-depth on respondents from 
six member states: France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and Spain.
Our findings suggest that people want the new Commission to focus its efforts 
on protecting the environment, promoting job growth, ensuring the viability of 
social security and addressing increasing living costs. Our results also suggest 
that people are – overall – optimistic about the EU, although there are important 
discrepancies across countries. Moreover, respondents think that the Commission 
will face increasingly divisive pressures in the future and will therefore move 
in the direction of promoting varying speeds of integration. They think that the 
EU might even face more exits like the one we are currently witnessing with the 
UK. Importantly, respondents who support populist parties on the left or right 
differ considerably from average voters in member states when it comes to policy 
priorities and their views on integration. Overall, these findings suggest that the 
new Commission faces the difficult challenge of addressing citizens’ concerns 
while expressing sensitivity for the differences between various party supporters.
Before we dig deeper into our results, we will briefly summarize the policy 
priorities that Ursula von der Leyen has set out in her speech to the European 
Parliament ahead of her confirmation. Doing so allows us to contextualize our 
survey findings and see whether her proposals match the views of those citizens 
surveyed in advance of her speech.
3 eupinions.eu/de/trends/ (accessed August 2019).
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In Focus 
Political Announcement 
and Public Expectation
T o what extent does the agenda that Ursula von der Leyen has set out for the new European Commission align with the expectations and priorities of European citizens? The main purpose of this report is to answer this question. In order to do so, we start by briefly summariz-
ing the key policy priorities that Ursula von der Leyen has laid out in her speech 
to the European Parliament ahead of her confirmation (see, The priorities of the 
new Commission President). Gaining empirical insight into the general public’s 
expectations and priorities is, of course, far more difficult and the main task of 
our empirical analysis. We choose to rely on a set of questions, that we think 
provides us with the sought-after empirical insights (see, The public’s priorities). 
We start by asking people what they think should be political priorities in the 
coming years. Respondents can pick two out of ten possible answers, which cover 
various topics including the environment, jobs, citizen rights, democracy and 
others. However, in order to gain a more complete insight into what people want 
politicians to do in terms of their policy mandate, we also ask our respondents what 
they are most worried about in their personal lives. This provides us with further 
valuable and relevant insights as people are often unaware of the political import 
of their “private” concerns. Once again, we ask our respondents to pick two out 
of nine possible answering options, that cover a different range of topics from 
poor health, rising living costs and crime all the way through political radicalism 
and loneliness. Addressing the public’s policy expectations as well as personal 
worries may well require the new Commission to develop further proposals for 
European cooperation and coordination. To examine the likely feasibility of such 
changes, we analyze what people think about the EU today and how they believe 
it is likely going to develop in the future. After having highlighted several inter-
esting variations across countries and age groups along all these dimensions, we 
turn towards the priorities, views and expectations of those respondents who 
state that they feel close to populist parties on the left or right of the political 
spectrum (see, Policy priorities of those who support populist parties on the left or 
right). Analyzing preferences along party lines is important, as these often stand 
representative for changing power structures in the European Parliament.
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The priorities of the new Commission president
Ursula von der Leyen was elected as the new president of the European Commis-
sion by the European Parliament on the 16th of July 2019 in a close vote garnering 
her only a paper-thin majority of nine votes above the minimum of 374.4 She 
addressed the issue cautiously in her first press conference as president-elect: 
“A majority is a majority in politics [and] I didn’t have a majority when I came 
two weeks ago. People didn’t know me.”5 Von der Leyen, who served as German 
defense minister at the time of her election, is the first woman in the history of 
the EU to be elected to the post of Commission president. Given that her name 
was not on the list of potential candidates that was circulated in Brussels last 
May following the European Parliament elections, her appointment proved a 
surprise to many.
The political context surrounding questions regarding who should lead the 
European Commission was much more complex in the spring of 2019 than it was 
during the European Parliament elections in 2014. The most recent elections 
resulted in heavy losses for the two large middle groups in the European Parliament, 
the conservative European People’s Party and the European Social Democrats, both of 
which traditionally served as the pool of potentials from which the Commission 
president emerged. By May 2019, the European Parliament was fragmented and 
the composition of the European Council, which officially proposes the candidate 
for the Commission president, was also prone to conflict with confrontations 
over the rule of law within the member states being far from resolved. In addi-
tion, European heads of state were no longer primarily either Conservatives or 
Social Democrats, and in countries such as Italy, Poland or the Czech Republic, 
for example, euroskeptic and populist politicians had taken office as leaders. The 
resistance found among some of these governments would ultimately destroy 
the candidacy of the Dutch Spitzenkandidat, Frans Timmermans, thereby making 
room for von der Leyen.
In addition, the largest group, the European People’s Party, had put forward 
Manfred Weber as Spitzenkandidat who, due to his lack of experience and his 
support for Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party, was soundly 
rejected by French President Emmanuel Macron. At the same time, Macron could 
find no support for a candidate from his preferred group of liberals, the Alliance 
of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE), which nonetheless won clear gains 
compared to the 2014 parliamentary election and reformed itself to become Renew 
Europe following the 2019 election.
Von der Leyen eventually succeeded as the winner within the European political 
minefield in which ideological and national contradictions have grown increas-
ingly profound. She managed to convince a majority of socialists and liberals in 
the parliament with promises of reforms and actions to take on climate issues 
and became the first woman to lead the Commission.
4 https://www.politico.eu/article/ursula-von-der-leyens-european-commission-president-narrowly-won- 
homecoming/ (accessed August 2019).
5 European Commission Youtube Channel www.youtube.com/watch (accessed August 2019).
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In her speech to the European Parliament on the 16th of July, von der Leyen 
set out an ambitious policy program for the next European Commission. Advocat-
ing for “a European Union that strives for more,”6 she proposed several policies, 
including the following nine:
• Introduce a Green Deal for Europe to make Europe the first climate-neutral 
continent in the world by 2050.
• Complete the Capital Markets Union to further break down barriers for 
cross-border investments and strengthen small and medium-sized enterprises.
• Reform the Stability and Growth Pact and thereby make use of the flexibility 
envisioned in the rules.
• Strengthen the European Pillar of Social Rights by introducing a European 
Unemployment Benefit Reinsurance Scheme, ensuring the Youth Guaran-
tee to fight youth unemployment and creating a Child Guarantee to protect 
children against poverty and social exclusion.
• Strengthen Gender Equality through full gender equality in the College of 
Commissioners.
• Strengthen the Rule of Law by promoting a new mechanism designed to 
fully protect basic freedoms.
• Introduce a New Pact on Migration and Asylum in order to strengthen border 
control by establishing a European Border and Coast Guard Agency and 
modernizing asylum rules through a Common European Asylum System.
• Establish a European Defence Union in order to facilitate cooperation on 
matters of security and defense and that foreign policy decisions are made 
by a qualified majority of member states.
• Introduce political reforms through a Conference on the Future of Europe 
in which citizens can have their say, improve the Spitzenkandidat system, 
and ensure a right of initiative for the European Parliament.
The public’s priorities
In order to determine what ordinary European citizens prioritize and whether 
these priorities match up with these policy proposals, we asked survey respondents 
which issues they think are the most important issues for the EU to focus on in 
the years to come. Respondents were asked to select two issues from a list of ten:
1. Jobs
2. The environment
3. Minorities
4. Social security
5. Citizen rights
6. Access to education
7. Equal opportunities
6 europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-19-4230_en.htm (accessed August 2019).
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8. Democracy
9. Public safety
10. None of the above
Figure 1 provides an overview of the responses given. It is important to note 
that due to the fact that respondents were asked to select two issues (or none) 
from the list, the answers in aggregate total 200%. For respondents in the EU 
as a whole (i.e., the EU27, excluding the United Kingdom), the environment is 
considered to be the EU’s key priority for the future (40%). Jobs are identified as 
the second most important issue (34%), followed by social security (23%), citizen 
rights (21%) and public safety (19%). Interestingly, respondents within the EU 
do not think that the protection of minority rights should be a key future priority 
for the EU. This is especially noteworthy in light of the recent attention given to 
the rule of law issues within the EU and the initiation of the article 7 procedure 
against Poland. Based on these results, it is fair to assume that the broader public 
has not yet internalized the importance and gravity of the situation with respect 
to violations of the rule of law.
Figure 1 also highlights interesting variations across countries in what people 
think the EU’s priorities regarding the future should be. While the environment 
is a key priority in France, Germany, the Netherlands and Poland, it is not iden-
tified as a top priority in Italy and Spain. In Italy, 60% of respondents think jobs 
are the top priority for the EU, while only 36% think that environment is key. In 
Spain, jobs are also identified as the key priority (40%), which is followed by the 
environment and social security (32% respectively). In France and Poland, jobs 
and the environment are considered of equal importance, with roughly 40% of 
respondents in France and 36% in Poland identifying both as top priorities in 
What issues are the most important issues to protect in the years to come? 
By country. In percent.
FIGURE 1 EU27: Top Priorities for the New European Commission to Protect
EU27
France
Germany
Italy
Netherlands
Poland
Spain
32 40 32 24 11 11 15 20 13
40 34 23 21 19 17 17 15 11
39 40 22 23 13 16 17 13 14
49 17 34 10 23 21 20 12 104
36 60 14 30 16 12 9 11 9
35 19 30 18 29 16 18 18 134
35 36 14 26 19 22 9 17 20
Environment Jobs Social Security Citizen Rights Public Safety
State of Democracy Equal Opportunities Access to Education Minority Rights
None of the above
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equal measure. In Germany and the Netherlands, the environment is considered 
to be the key priority (49% and 35% respectively), followed by social security. 
Jobs are not considered a key priority among Dutch and German respondents 
(19% and 17% respectively). Public safety is also a key concern among Dutch 
(29%) and German respondents (23%).
Are there differences between age cohorts when it comes to identifying 
future policy priorities for the EU? Figure 2 provides an overview of the priorities 
expressed by European respondents according to age cohorts and depicts some 
interesting patterns. For those respondents aged between 16 and 25, the environ-
ment in particular is seen as a key priority (47%). By contrast, older respondents 
think the environment is less of a priority.
Young respondents between 16 and 25 years of age also care more about 
equal opportunities (20%) than does the average of all respondents (17%). This 
young cohort is considerably less concerned about social security, with only 
14% of 16-to-25 year-old respondents identifying this as a priority, while 23% 
of all respondents see it as a priority. Older age cohorts are also more likely 
than younger cohorts to identify jobs as a key priority for the EU to focus on 
in the future. Respondents who are 36 and older also care much more about 
social security than do younger cohorts. Some 26% of the 36-to-45 year-olds 
identify it as a key priority, as do 28% of those aged 46-to-55 and 29% of 
those aged 56-to-65.
The findings presented in figures 1 and 2 suggest that some of the ideas 
outlined by von der Leyen in her early July speech to the European Parliament 
dovetail with the policy priorities of European citizens. This is especially the 
case regarding her proposals for a new Green Deal, an extension of social rights, 
and a focus on economic and job growth by completing the Capital Union.
Yet, in order to understand more fully what people want politicians to do in 
terms of their policy mandate, we also have to focus on what people are pre-oc-
cupied with in terms of their own lives. This is relevant because people are often 
What issues are the most important issues to protect in the years to come? In percent.
FIGURE 2 EU27: Top Priorities for the New European Commission to Protect across Age Groups
All
16–25
26–35
36–45
46–55
56–65
Environment Jobs Social Security Citizen Rights Public Safety
State of Democracy Equal Opportunities Access to Education Minority Rights
None of the above
40 34 23 21 19 17 17 15 11
47 29 14 20 17 15 20 19 6 13
38 37 19 21 18 16 18 18 114
36 36 26 21 21 16 17 12 13
40 34 28 20 20 18 13 13 12
38 30 29 21 20 23 12 14 11
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unaware of the political aspects of their “private” concerns. We therefore asked 
them to identify two issues from a list of nine that they worry about most when 
it comes to their own lives:
1. Job insecurity
2. Poor health
3. Personal loss
4. Rising cost of living
5. Crime
6. Loneliness
7. Political radicalism
8. Housing
9. None of the above
Figure 3 provides an overview of respondents’ answers. Within the EU27, people 
are most worried about the rising cost of living; 51% identify this issue to be one 
of the two things they worry about most. Poor health (28%), job insecurity (25%) 
and crime (21%) also feature high on the list of personal worries. Less than 10% 
of respondents in the EU as a whole worry about loneliness or personal loss. As 
in the case of policy priorities, personal priorities also vary by country. While 
rising living costs is the key concern in all six countries we studied more in-depth, 
it is a particular concern for French and Polish respondents. A total of 61% of 
respondents in France and 62% in Poland state that the rising cost of living is a 
key issue of concern. In Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain, this share 
varies between 44% and 49%. In Italy and Spain, job insecurity is a similarly 
strong focus of concern (46% in Italy, 41% in Spain). Interestingly, for German 
respondents, political radicalism is something they are deeply worried about in 
their lives. More than one-fourth (28%) name this as a top concern, compared to 
What are you most worried about in your personal life? Most important in percent.
FIGURE 3 EU27: Top Priorities for People Personally in Years to Come
EU27
France
Germany
Italy
Netherlands
Poland
Spain
Rising Living Costs Poor Health Job Insecurity Crime Political Radicalism
Housing Personal Loss Loneliness None of the above
51 28 25 21 16 13 9 9 28
61 24 24 17 15 11 76 35
44 20 12 25 28 18 9 9 35
45 36 46 16 9 6 8 9 25
49 15 25 23 19 14 11 13 31
62 26 19 17 18 11 7 11 29
44 33 41 18 14 10 10 7 23
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16% in the EU as a whole. This result stands in stark contrast to Italy, where only 
9% of those polled worry about political radicalism. 25% of German respondents 
and 23% of Dutch respondents are also worried about crime, while this registers 
as a worrying point among French, Italian, Polish and Spanish respondents only 
between 16% and 18%.
What about differences between age cohorts? Figure 4 provides us with an 
overview and points to several outliers. Similarities across age cohorts include the 
fact that the rising cost of living registers as the biggest worry across the sample. 
However, whereas housing is much more of a concern among the 16-to-25 and 
26-to-35-year olds, poor health is a major source of worry for the 56-to-65-year 
olds. This difference is not surprising given the different challenges people face 
throughout the course of their life cycle. Worth noting is that loneliness is much 
more of a concern among the youngest age cohort, the 16-to-25-year olds (15%) 
than it is among those aged 46 or older (6% to 7%).
Our findings presented in figures 3 and 4 suggest that battling rising living 
costs and job insecurity will be important for the new European Commission, as 
citizens across the EU are very worried about these issues.
Addressing the key concerns of citizens as well as what they feel should be 
policy priorities might require the new Commission to develop further propos-
als for European cooperation and coordination. Against this backdrop, we now 
examine what people think about the EU and how they expect it to evolve in the 
future. Figure 5 provides an overview of what people think of the EU. We focus 
on three questions in particular:
1. Do you agree with the following statement? We need more political and economic 
integration across Europe.
2. Imagine you talk with a friend or colleague about the European Union. Would your 
conversation be positive or negative?
3. Overall, do you feel optimistic or pessimistic about the future of the European Union?
What are you most worried about in your personal life? Most important in percent. 
FIGURE 4 EU27: Top Priorities for People Personally across Age Groups
Rising Living Costs Poor Health Job Insecurity Crime Political Radicalism
Housing Personal Loss Loneliness None of the above
All
16–25
26–35
36–45
46–55
56–65
51 28 25 21 16 13 9 9 28
45 20 27 20 15 16 10 15 32
53 21 28 19 14 17 9 9 30
52 26 29 22 16 12 9 9 25
50 33 25 21 18 10 10 7 26
51 39 15 23 20 7 8 6 31
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The results suggest that overall, people are quite supportive of the EU. Within 
the EU as a whole, 54% would support deepening political and economic inte-
gration in Europe, 62% would express positive views about the EU to friends, 
and 50% are optimistic about its future. Additional evidence regarding people’s 
general attitudes and sentiment towards the European Union can be found 
in our trend numbers which we collect quarterly. We find quite some variation 
across countries, however. While Italian and Spanish respondents are most 
supportive of political and economic integration in Europe (roughly 70%), 
only 39% of Dutch and 41% of French respondents support more political 
and economic integration. German and Polish respondents fall more in the 
middle on this issue.
Do you agree with the following statement? 
Answering with yes in percent. 
Support for More Political and Economic Integration
Would Talk Positively About the EU to Friends
Optimistic about the Future of the EU
FIGURE 5 EU27: What People 
Think About the EU
EU27
France
Germany
Italy
Netherlands
Poland
Spain
54%
62%
50%
41%
50%
37%
60%
66%
51%
70%
43%
41%
39%
62%
49%
52%
81%
63%
68%
72%
61%
Do you agree with the following statement? 
Answering with yes in percent. 
Support for More Political and Economic Integration
Would Talk Positively About the EU to Friends
Optimistic about the Future of the EU
FIGURE 6 EU27: What People Think 
About the EU across Age Groups
All
16–25
26–35
36–45
46–55
56–65
54%
62%
50%
56%
69%
52%
55%
61%
50%
53%
60%
49%
52%
60%
48%
54%
59%
50%
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When it comes to conversations about the EU with friends, we see a different 
pattern. Italians in this case are much more skeptical of the EU. Only 43% 
of Italian respondents state that they would speak positively of the EU to 
friends, which is also true for only 50% of French respondents. Polish and 
Spanish respondents are more likely to express positive views about the EU 
in conversation with friends (81% and 72%, respectively).
We also find interesting differences across age cohorts, which are depicted 
in figure 6. Those aged between 16 and 25 are clearly the strongest in favor of 
European integration. Some 56% of this group support deepening political and 
economic integration, 69% state that they would speak in positive terms about 
the EU, and 52% are optimistic about the future of the EU. The 46-to-55 year-
olds are the most critical of the EU. Nonetheless, despite the fact that only 48% 
of those aged 46 to 55 express optimism about the EU’s future, the majority of 
respondents in this cohort express positive views regarding the EU. Some 52% 
voice support for more political and economic integration in Europe, and 60% 
would speak positively of the EU in conversation with friends.
Now we turn to what respondents think the future of the EU will look like. 
Respondents were asked to select one of five possible scenarios:
1. The EU will no longer exist
2. More exits like UK
3. EU will remain the same
4. Different speeds of integration
5. A United States of Europe
Figure 7 provides an overview of which scenarios respondents think are most 
likely for the EU in the future. Within the EU27, respondents are most likely to 
think that the EU will experience more exits like that of the UK (35%), followed 
by 31% of respondents who think there will be different speeds of integration 
Do you agree with the following statement? Answering with yes in percent.
FIGURE 7 EU27: Expectations about the Future of the EU
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in the future. Some 20% think that things will remain the same, while only 9% 
think the EU will cease to exist in the future, and 5% think that there will be a 
United States of Europe.
Figure 7 also points to relevant variations across countries. The percentage of 
those who expect to see more exits like that of the UK is highest in France (42%) 
and lowest in Spain (28%). German, Italian, Dutch and Polish respondents lie 
somewhere in the middle with just over 30% of respondents in these countries 
anticipating more exits. Polish and Spanish respondents prove much more likely 
to expect that the EU will remain the same (21% and 33%, respectively) than their 
German and Dutch counterparts (13% and 15%, respectively). Compared with 
other countries, respondents in Germany are much more likely to think that an 
EU with different speeds of integration will develop in the future.
Figure 8 provides the distribution across age cohorts. Interestingly, younger age 
cohorts are much more likely to expect a growing number of UK-like exits (40% of 
the 16-to-25 year-olds; 37% of the 26-to-35 year-olds). By contrast, only 33% of 
those aged 46 to 55 and 31% of those aged 56 to 65 expect more exits. Respond-
ents within the older age cohorts are much more likely to think that there will be 
different speeds of integration (35% of the 56-to-65 year-olds and 33% of the 
46-to-55 year-olds) than the younger age cohorts (28% of the 16-to-25 year- olds).
Overall, the results presented in figures 5 to 8 suggest that European citizens 
hold generally quite positive views of the EU but, at the same time, think that 
there is a real chance of more exits being pursued like that of the UK or greater 
differentiation between member states in terms of integration speed. This sug-
gests that while the new Commission can count on public support for tackling 
key policy concerns and addressing worries through a joint European approach, 
citizens nonetheless harbor certain reservations about the EU’s capacity to act 
in concert. This finding resonates with a contradiction we’ve observed in earlier 
studies: Europeans demonstrate a high willingness to support and contribute 
to the European project but have relatively low expectations regarding how the 
project pans out in the medium-to-long term.
Do you agree with the following statement? Answering with yes in percent.
FIGURE 8 EU27: Expectations about the Future of the EU across Age Groups
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Policy priorities of those who support populist parties  
on the left or right
In a final step, we examine how priorities and views regarding the EU differ across 
supporters of different parties. In this report we choose to focus on the views of 
those respondents who state that they feel close to populist parties on the left 
or right of the political spectrum. Having said that, we do provide more detailed 
breakdowns of the views of all party supporters for the six countries we investigate 
in more detail. These figures can be found on our accompanying website 7. Figure 9 
provides an overview of what these respondents think the core priorities of the EU 
should be in the future. It’s worth being reminded here that figure 1 shows that 
within the EU as a whole, most people think that the environment should be the 
EU’s key priority in the years to come. In contrast, however, the environment is not 
identified as a key priority among those who support populist parties to the right. 
For example, only 7% of those in support of Forum voor Democratie, a right-wing 
populist party in the Netherlands, think the environment should be made a priority, 
and only 14% of those in support of the Alternative für Deutschland party see the 
environment as a key priority. Jobs seem to be the key priority among supporters 
of the populist right in France Italy, Poland and Spain. Some 51% of supporters 
of France’s Rassemblement National, 70% of Italy’s Lega, 47% of Poland’s Prawo 
i Sprawiedliwość (PiS) and 43% of Spain’s Vox placed jobs at the top of their list. 
7 https://eupinions.eu/de/graphics/ 
What issues should be protected in the coming years? Most important in percent.
FIGURE 9 EU27: Top Priorities for the New European Commission to Protect 
 by Leftwing and Rightwing Populist Party Supporters in Years to Come
ENVIRONMENT
JOBS
SOCIAL SECURITY
CITIZEN RIGHTS
PUBLIC SAFETY
STATE OF DEMOCRACY
26 14 30 7 21 32 323850 50 40 22
51 32 70 24 15 47 433329 17 60 23
23 40 19 42 30 16 172731 49 12 47
22 17 29 18 18 19 233632 8 38 25
24 49 24 42 30 24 20519 10 11 26
16 18 8 25 21 15 11118 13 9 10
13 13 7 8 25 9 18138 21 9 20
8 3 7 13 9 18 102612 18 11 19
2 2 2 15 3 1 427 6 3 2
15 12 4 6 28 19 2294 8 7 6
EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES
ACCESS TO EDUCATION
MINORITY RIGHTS
NONE OF THE ABOVE
Leftwing 
Populist Parties
Rightwing 
Populist Parties
Rassemblement National Alternative für Deutschland Lega Forum voor Democratie
Partij voor de Vrijheid Prawo i Sprawiedliwość Vox
La France Insoumise Die Linke Movimento Cinque Stelle
Socialistische Partij Podemos
18
EUPINIONS  GREAT EXPECTATIONS
Public safety seems to be more important among supporters of the populist right 
in Germany (49% of Alternative für Deutschland supporters) and the Netherlands 
(42% of Forum voor Democratie and 30% of Partij voor de Vrijheid supporters).
Supporters of leftist populist parties vary considerably in their desired policy 
priorities. While supporters of the Movimento 5 Stelle in Italy, a party not easily 
classified as left or right, think that jobs should be a key priority (60%), supporters 
of the Dutch Socialistische Partij would prefer prioritizing social security (47%). 
Supporters of the Die Linke in Germany also care very much about social security 
(49%) as well as the environment (50%). Supporters of Podemos in Spain view 
the environment and citizen rights as key priorities (38% and 36% respectively). 
Those in France who support the La France Insoumise party view the environment 
as the most important priority (50%).
Figure 10 shows the things that supporters of populist parties on the right or 
left are most worried about when it comes to their own lives. Here we see more 
uniformity. For party supporters of both the populist left and right, the rising 
costs of living are the major source of worry in their own lives. This dovetails 
with our results for European citizens as a whole. For Lega supporters in Italy, 
job insecurity is also a major source of worry (44%), as it is for those who sup-
port the Movimento 5 Stelle (49%) in Italy and Podemos in Spain (51%). Finally, 
for Alternative für Deutschland supporters, crime is a key source of worry (51%).
In a last step, we delve deeper into the views regarding the EU that are expressed 
by supporters of populist parties to the right or left. Figure 11.1 and 11.2 present an 
overview of the results and underscore several things that stand out. First, most 
supporters of the populist right express much less positive views of the EU than 
do the EU27 respondents as a whole or most of those who support the populist left. 
What issues should be protected in the coming years? Most important in percent.
FIGURE 10 EU27: Top Priorities for People Personally 
 by Leftwing and Rightwing Populist Party Supporters in Years to Come
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Alternative für Deutschland supporters in Germany and Forum voor Democratie sup-
porters in the Netherlands express the least positive views regarding the EU. Only 
22% of Alternative für Deutschland supporters and only 17% of Forum voor Democratie 
supporters want more political and economic integration, for example. Interestingly, 
Lega supporters in Italy are clear supporters of deepening integration (60%) but are, 
at the same time, not likely to speak positively of the EU in conversation with friends 
(29%) or express optimism about the EU’s future (34%). Nonetheless, compared to 
Alternative für Deutschland supporters in Germany and Forum voor Democratie sup-
porters in the Netherlands, Italy’s Lega supporters are more optimistic about the EU.
Second, supporters of populist parties to the left express much more positive 
views of the EU compared to their counterparts on the right, albeit less so than 
the general public. Those expressing the most positive views are supporters of 
the Die Linke in Germany (73% support deepening EU integration) and Podemos 
FIGURE 11.1 EU27: What People Think about the EU by Leftwing to Rightwing Party Supporters
Personal sentiments about the state of the European Union. Answering with yes in percent.
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Do you agree with the following statement?  Answering with yes in percent.
FIGURE 11.2 EU27: What People Think about the EU by Leftwing to Rightwing Party Supporters
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in Spain (82% express optimism about the future of the EU). The supporters of 
the Socialistische Partij in the Netherlands report very negative views of the EU that 
resemble those of supporters of the populist right. A total of 42% of Socialistische 
Partij supporters are in favor of more political and economic integration in Europe 
and speak positively of the EU when talking with friends.
Third, supporters of populist parties to the right or left agree more when it 
comes to their expectations about the future of the EU. Most populist party sup-
porters think that the EU will face more exits like that of the UK, and the share 
of those who anticipate such exits is higher than that of the general public. Some 
48% of Rassemblement National supporters in France and 47% of Alternative für 
Deutschland supporters think that the EU will face more Brexit-like exits, as do 
41% of Movimento 5 Stelle supporters and 40% of Socialistische Partij supporters. 
In Spain, the largest share of Podemos supporters (35%) think that the EU will 
remain the same, and the largest share of Die Linke supporters in Germany (44%) 
think that an EU of different integration speeds will prove most likely.
Overall, the results presented in figures 9, 10, 11.1 and 11.2 suggest that sup-
porters of populist parties differ from the general public in several key aspects. 
Unlike the general public, they are less likely to view the environment as a key 
policy priority and would rather prioritize jobs. They also are much more skep-
tical about the EU compared to the public at large. This suggests that the new 
Commission will have to find a way to bridge some of the core divisions found 
among the European public. Perhaps most importantly, the Commission will 
need to bridge the divide between supporters of mainstream and populist parties, 
particularly those on the right.
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Concluding Remarks
U rsula von der Leyen’s pre-election speech, in which she highlighted her personal ties to the European project, attracted considerable press attention. Sharing bits of her family history and personal experience as a child to a father who worked in Brussels and as a mother who speaks 
with her children about Europe, she gave testimony to the European ideal, not 
just personally, but also in terms of correspondingly strong policy proposals.
Based on the survey data we have been collecting since 2015, we have good 
reason to believe that these proposals as well as von der Leyen’s personal attachment 
and empathy towards the European project, will resonate with a great number of 
European citizens. However, the key question for most European citizens going 
forward will be: Can she reach her goals? In light of this question, it’s worth 
considering the political and institutional environment she faces.
• A newly elected European Parliament that is more heterogeneous and polar-
ized than ever before. The European People’s Party and Social Democrats can 
no longer exercise their hegemony and must share power with the Liberals 
and Greens. What’s more, around 25 percent of seats are occupied by popu-
list and nationalist forces, a true testament to novel power relations that are 
likely going to further complicate the attainment of majorities. Remember 
that von der Leyen herself secured her confirmation vote by no more than a 
thin margin of nine votes.
• A European Council that has recently proven it can act as a unified institution 
when it manages to align the interests within (e.g., Brexit, European top jobs, 
etc.) but is also challenged by significant internal frictions when it comes 
to specific principles, worldviews and values (e.g., the rule of law, minority 
rights, etc.).
• A European public that is – as we have shown in numerous eupinions 
studies – torn between holding high expectations of what European politics 
should achieve and a low level of trust in the capacity of the EU to actually 
deliver.
Ursula von der Leyen has raised the stakes and made promises to a European 
public that longs for an operational and cooperative EU, but has instead been 
witness to considerable dysfunctionality and confrontational conflict in recent 
years. The latter issue begs the question: Even if the new Commission achieves 
functional cooperation, will it be able to claim and own this success? Given 
that the European Commission traditionally struggles to construct a narrative, 
this is a relevant and open question. The Commission grapples with the con-
siderable geographical distance that exists between itself and several member 
states, the fact that there is no truly European media in place and that it must 
be both a political actor and the guardian of EU treaties. These conditions have 
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made it difficult for the Commission to reach out to the European public. If the 
von der Leyen Commission has the ambition to change these conditions, three 
factors will prove crucial:
• Personal style: From her roles as a top national politician, Ursula von der Leyen 
is known for her proactive approach to dealing with the media, not shying 
away from announcing ambitious goals and calling for action. Naturally, this 
style provokes controversy and invites criticism which von der Leyen has 
faced frequently throughout her career. All the while, she has been handed 
difficult portfolios such as the German Federal Ministry of Defence that almost 
proved fatal to the favorable reputation of her predecessor in this position, 
Thomas de Maizière. All the more, it is worth stressing that von der Leyen 
managed to stay in office for five and a half years. Only one of her predeces-
sors held this position for longer. Despite the frequent criticism and attacks, 
she has not seemed prone to adapt her style. There is no reason to think that 
she will, as president of the European Commission, act differently.
• Managing style: As the secretary of family affairs, of labor and social issues 
or of defense, she had to manage her bureaucracy, her portfolio and her 
performance. In her new position however, she will preside over a large 
college of commissioners hailing from different backgrounds, each with 
her/his own set of experiences, capacities and competences. Given the her-
culean nature of raising the profile of the European Commission and reach-
ing out to the European citizens, the crucial question is whether she will be 
able to empower other commissioners, thereby allowing them to shine and 
act as multipliers of the Commission’s agenda. Among those put forth by 
von der Leyen for the Commission, candidates like Margrethe Verstager 
and Frans Timmermans have already made a name for themselves in the 
previous Juncker Commission. Presumably, their strength as political actors 
and their notoriety will not suffer in the von der Leyen Commission. Other 
newcomers will be keen to build up a reputation and leave a mark in the 
Commission’s work. Will von der Leyen be able to lead this entire team to 
success?
• Capacity to work the inter-institutional relationship: When it comes to grab-
bing the spotlight for the European Commission, the highest hurdle to clear 
will be improving cooperation with the European Council or, more precise-
ly, the national governments that comprise it. National governments have 
become accustomed to being able to attract praise for European successes 
and pass the buck when it comes to failures. Despite growing awareness that 
this might involve short-term gains at the cost of long-term losses, no 
national government has thus far proved able to resist playing the blame 
game. An active and visible Commission will likely clash with various  na-
tional governments over policy initiatives. This will without doubt compli-
cate the dealings held between the institutions.
The issue of digital taxation comes to mind as one of the potential minefields. As 
recent as March 2019, the European Council failed to agree on a digital service 
tax.8 Some national governments are worried about the impact it would have on 
8 www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/digital-taxation/ (accessed August 2019).
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companies in their national markets and thus vetoed the plans. Despite this set-
back, issues that address the digital market, its set-up, regulation and taxation 
remain crucial for the EU. President-elect von der Leyen raised the point in her 
election speech: “And I will stand for fair taxes – whether for brick and mortar 
industries or digital businesses. When the tech giants are making huge profits in 
Europe, this is fine because we are an open market and we like competition. But 
if they are making these profits by benefiting from our education system, our 
skilled workers, our infrastructure and our social security, if this is so, it is not 
acceptable that they make profits, but they are barely paying any taxes because 
they play our tax system. If they want to benefit, they have to share the burden.”9
This statement certainly resonated with the majority of parliamentarians 
present in the European Parliament who had voted in favor of the digital service 
tax in December 2018.10 But it also clashes with individual national interests 
represented in the European Council and suggests there will be trouble ahead. 
For its part, the Council has been struggling to resolve the contradictory interests 
found among its member states. TechCrunch, the largest publisher for the tech/
digital industry, summarizes the situation as follows: “The power of tech giants 
to influence entire nations is now writ large in EU domestic politics. Europe 
knows it needs to hammer out an agreement on reforming digital taxation, with 
rising citizen anger over tax inequalities. The question is how to do it when 
certain states with low corporate tax rates have been colonized by tech giants 
which definitely don’t want tax reform to happen.”11 This is one of many high-
stakes issues such as energy policy, migration or eurozone reform that are in 
need of urgent attention but which are plagued by diverging interests that the 
Commission will face in its term ahead.
Whatever the challenge or the crisis ahead, the European elections have ush-
ered in a changing of the guard that has altered the European political landscape 
for good. As they set the tone for the next five years, the new commissioners will 
have to plan, act capably and be subject to scrutiny.
9 ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_19_4230 (accessed August 2019).
10 www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/economy/20181210STO21402/parliament-votes-on-eu- 
wide-tech-tax (accessed August 2019).
11 techcrunch.com/2019/06/15/where-is-the-eu-going-on-tech-and-competition-policy/  
(accessed August 2019).
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GLOSSARY
Glossary
ORG. ABBREVIATION ORIGINAL NAME ENGLISH TRANSLATION
France
RN Rassemblement National National Rally
LR Les Républicains The Republicans
MoDem Mouvement Démocrate Democratic Movement
LaREM La République en Marche ! The Republic on the Move
PS Parti Socialiste Socialist Party
LFI La France Insoumise Unsubmissive France
Germany
AfD Alternative für Deutschland Alternative for Germany
FDP Freie Demokratische Partei Free Democratic Party
CDU / CSU Christlich Demokratische Uni-
on / Christlich-Soziale Union
Christian democratic political 
alliance / Christian Social Union
SPD Sozialdemokratische Partei 
Deutschlands
Social Democratic Party  
of Germany
B90 / Grüne Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen Alliance 90 / The Greens
Die Linke Die Linke The Left
Italy
LN Lega Nord / Lega Northern League / League
FI Forza Italia Forward Italy
PD Partito Democratico Democratic Party
MVCS Movimento 5 Stelle 5 Star Movement
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Netherlands
PVV Partij voor de Vrijheid Party for Freedom
FvD Forum voor Democratie Forum for Democracy
VVD Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en 
Democratie
People’s Party for Freedom and 
Democracy
CDA Christen-Democratisch Appèl Christian Democratic Appeal
D66 Democraten66 Democrats66
CU Christen Unie Christian Union
PvdA Partij van de Arbeid Labour Party
DENK Beweging DENK Movement DENK
GL Groen Links Green Left
SP Socialistische Partij Socialist Party
Poland
K’15 Kukiz’15 Kukiz’15
PiS Prawo i Sprawiedliwość Law and Justice
.Nowo Nowoczesna Modern 
PO Platforma Obywatelska Civic Platform
Wiosna Wiosna Spring
Spain
PP Partido Popular People’s Party
C’s Ciudadanos Citizens
PSOE Partido Socialista Obrero 
Español
Spanish Socialists Workers Party
Podemos Podemos We can
Vox Vox Vox
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METHOD
Method
T his report presents an overview of a study conducted by Dalia Research between 2019-06-17 and 2019-06-28 on public opinion across 27 EU Member States, excluding the United Kingdom. The sample of n=12,123 was drawn across all 27 EU Member States, excluding the 
United Kingdom, taking into account current population distributions with regard 
to age (16–65 years), gender and region/country. In order to obtain census rep-
resentative results, the data were weighted based upon the most recent Eurostat 
statistics. The target weighting variables were age, gender, level of education 
(as defined by ISCED (2011) levels 0–2, 3–4, and 5–8), and degree of urbaniza-
tion (rural and urban). An iterative algorithm was used to identify the optimal 
combination of weighting variables based on sample composition within each 
country. An estimation of the overall design effect based on the distribution of 
weights was calculated at 1.42 at the global level. Calculated for a sample of this 
size and considering the design-effect, the margin of error would be 1.1% at a 
confidence level of 95%.
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Data Appendix
EU27: Top Priorities for the New European Commission to Protect
What issues are the most important issues to protect in the years to come?  
By country. In percent.
EU27 France Germany Italy Netherlands Poland Spain
Environment 40 % 39 % 49 % 36 % 35 % 35 % 32 %
Jobs 34 % 40 % 17 % 60 % 19 % 36 % 40 %
Social Security 23 % 22 % 34 % 14 % 30 % 14 % 32 %
Citizen Rights 21 % 23 % 10 % 30 % 18 % 26 % 24 %
Public Safety 19 % 13 % 23 % 16 % 29 % 19 % 11 %
State of  
Democracy 17 % 16 % 21 % 12 % 16 % 22 % 11 %
Equal  
Opportunities 17 % 17 % 20 % 9 % 18 % 9 % 15 %
Access to  
Education 15 % 13 % 12 % 11 % 18 % 17 % 20 %
Minority Rights 3 % 3 % 4 % 3 % 4 % 2 % 2 %
None of the above 11 % 14 % 10 % 9 % 13 % 20 % 13 %
EU27: Top Priorities for the New European Commission to Protect across Age Groups
What issues are the most important issues to protect in the years to come? In percent.
All 16–25 26–35 36–45 46–55 56–65
Environment 40 % 47 % 38 % 36 % 40 % 38 %
Jobs 34 % 29 % 37 % 36 % 34 % 30 %
Social Security 23 % 14 % 19 % 26 % 28 % 29 %
Citizen Rights 21 % 20 % 21 % 21 % 20 % 21 %
Public Safety 19 % 17 % 18 % 21 % 20 % 20 %
State of  
Democracy 17 % 15 % 16 % 16 % 18 % 23 %
Equal  
Opportunities 17 % 20 % 18 % 17 % 13 % 12 %
Access to  
Education 15 % 19 % 18 % 12 % 13 % 14 %
Minority Rights 3 % 6 % 4 % 2 % 2 % 2 %
None of the above 11 % 13 % 11 % 13 % 12 % 11 %
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EU27: Top Priorities for People Personally in Years to Come
What are you most worried about in your personal life? Most important in percent.
EU27 France Germany Italy Netherlands Poland Spain
Rising Living 
Costs 51 % 61 % 44 % 45 % 49 % 62 % 44 %
Poor Health 28 % 24 % 20 % 36 % 15 % 26 % 33 %
Job Insecurity 25 % 24 % 12 % 46 % 25 % 19 % 41 %
Crime 21 % 17 % 25 % 16 % 23 % 17 % 18 %
Political  
Radicalism 16 % 15 % 28 % 9 % 19 % 18 % 14 %
Housing 13 % 11 % 18 % 6 % 14 % 11 % 10 %
Personal Loss 9 % 6 % 9 % 8 % 11 % 7 % 10 %
Loneliness 9 % 7 % 9 % 9 % 13 % 11 % 7 %
None of the above 28 % 35 % 35 % 25 % 31 % 29 % 23 %
EU27: Top Priorities for People Personally across Age Groups
What are you most worried about in your personal life? Most important in percent.
All 16–25 26–35 36–45 46–55 56–65
Rising Living 
Costs 51 % 45 % 53 % 52 % 50 % 51 %
Poor Health 28 % 20 % 21 % 26 % 33 % 39 %
Job Insecurity 25 % 27 % 28 % 29 % 25 % 15 %
Crime 21 % 20 % 19 % 22 % 21 % 23 %
Political  
Radicalism 16 % 15 % 14 % 16 % 18 % 20 %
Housing 13 % 16 % 17 % 12 % 10 % 7 %
Personal Loss 9 % 10 % 9 % 9 % 10 % 8 %
Loneliness 9 % 15 % 9 % 9 % 7 % 6 %
None of the above 28 % 32 % 30 % 25 % 26 % 31 %
EU27: What People Think About the EU
Do you agree with the following statement? Answering with yes in percent.
EU27 France Germany Italy Netherlands Poland Spain
Support for 
More Political 
and Economic 
Integration
54 % 41 % 60 % 70 % 39 % 52 % 68 %
Would Talk  
Positively About 
the EU to Friends
62 % 50 % 66 % 43 % 62 % 81 % 72 %
Optimistic about 
the Future of 
the EU
50 % 37 % 51 % 41 % 49 % 63 % 61 %
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EU27: What People Think About the EU across Age Groups
Do you agree with the following statement? Answering with yes in percent.
All 16–25 26–35 36–45 46–55 56–65
Support for 
More Political 
and Economic 
Integration
54 % 56 % 55 % 53 % 52 % 54 %
Would Talk  
Positively About 
the EU to Friends
62 % 69 % 61 % 60 % 60 % 59 %
Optimistic about 
the Future of 
the EU
50 % 52 % 50 % 49 % 48 % 50 %
EU27: Expectations about the Future of the EU
Do you agree with the following statement? Answering with yes in percent.
EU27 France Germany Italy Netherlands Poland Spain
The EU Will No 
Longer Exist 9 % 11 % 6 % 11 % 7 % 8 % 4 %
More Exits 
like UK 35 % 42 % 32 % 35 % 36 % 33 % 28 %
EU Will Remain 
the Same 20 % 18 % 13 % 17 % 15 % 21 % 33 %
Different Speeds 
of Integration 31 % 23 % 46 % 30 % 37 % 35 % 28 %
A United States 
of Europe 5 % 6 % 3 % 7 % 5 % 3 % 7 %
EU27: Expectations about the Future of the EU across Age Groups
Do you agree with the following statement? Answering with yes in percent.
All 16–25 26–35 36–45 46–55 56–65
The EU Will No 
Longer Exist 9 % 10 % 8 % 9 % 9 % 8 %
More Exits 
like UK 35 % 40 % 37 % 34 % 33 % 31 %
EU Will Remain 
the Same 20 % 18 % 20 % 21 % 19 % 20 %
Different Speeds 
of Integration 31 % 28 % 30 % 31 % 33 % 35 %
A United States 
of Europe 5 % 4 % 5 % 5 % 6 % 6 %
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EU27: Top Priorities for the New European Commission to Protect by Leftwing and  
Rightwing Populist Party Supporters in Years to Come
What issues should be protected in the coming years? Most important in percent.
Leftwing  
Populist Parties LFI Die Linke MVCS SP Podemos
Environment 50 % 50 % 40 % 22 % 38 %
Jobs 29 % 17 % 60 % 23 % 33 %
Social Security 31 % 49 % 12 % 47 % 27 %
Citizen Rights 32 % 8 % 38 % 25 % 36 %
Public Safety 19 % 10 % 11 % 26 % 5 %
State of  
Democracy 8 % 13 % 9 % 10 % 11 %
Equal  
Opportunities 8 % 21 % 9 % 20 % 13 %
Access to  
Education 12 % 18 % 11 % 19 % 26 %
Minority Rights 7 % 6 % 3 % 2 % 2 %
None of the 
above 4 % 8 % 7 % 6 % 9 %
Rightwing
Populist Parties RN AfD LN FvD PVV PiS Vox
Environment 26 % 14 % 30 % 7 % 21 % 32 % 32 %
Jobs 51 % 32 % 70 % 24 % 15 % 47 % 43 %
Social Security 23 % 40 % 19 % 42 % 30 % 16 % 17 %
Citizen Rights 22 % 17 % 29 % 18 % 18 % 19 % 23 %
Public Safety 24 % 49 % 24 % 42 % 30 % 24 % 20 %
State of  
Democracy 16 % 18 % 8 % 25 % 21 % 15 % 11 %
Equal  
Opportunities 13 % 13 % 7 % 8 % 25 % 9 % 18 %
Access to  
Education 8 % 3 % 7 % 13 % 9 % 18 % 10 %
Minority Rights 2 % 2 % 2 % 15 % 3 % 1 % 4 %
None of the above 15 % 12 % 4 % 6 % 28 % 19 % 22 %
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EU27: Top Priorities for People Personally by Leftwing and Rightwing  
Populist Party Supporters in Years to Come
What issues should be protected in the coming years? Most important in percent.
Leftwing  
Populist Parties LFI Die Linke MVCS SP Podemos
Rising Living 
Costs 55 % 54 % 51 % 60 % 55 %
Poor Health 35 % 24 % 35 % 30 % 26 %
Job Insecurity 15 % 11 % 49 % 14 % 51 %
Crime 10 % 16 % 11 % 20 % 9 %
Political  
Radicalism 21 % 32 % 8 % 18 % 12 %
Housing 16 % 19 % 7 % 12 % 13 %
Personal Loss 16 % 9 % 8 % 12 % 6 %
Loneliness 11 % 10 % 6 % 11 % 9 %
None of the 
above 21 % 25 % 25 % 23 % 19 %
Rightwing
Populist Parties RN AfD LN FvD PVV PiS Vox
Rising Living 
Costs 70 % 55 % 47 % 57 % 53 % 53 % 43 %
Poor Health 19 % 14 % 37 % 16 % 17 % 34 % 22 %
Job Insecurity 30 % 11 % 44 % 24 % 16 % 18 % 31 %
Crime 25 % 51 % 24 % 35 % 22 % 24 % 24 %
Political  
Radicalism 6 % 11 % 3 % 5 % 8 % 7 % 27 %
Housing 12 % 19 % 5 % 15 % 7 % 11 % 7 %
Personal Loss 6 % 9 % 9 % 10 % 9 % 6 % 5 %
Loneliness 7 % 7 % 9 % 7 % 14 % 10 % 7 %
None of the above 25 % 23 % 22 % 31 % 54 % 37 % 34 %
EU27: What People Think about the EU by Leftwing to Rightwing Party Supporters
Personal sentiments about the state of the European Union. Answering with yes in percent.
Leftwing  
Populist Parties LFI Die Linke MVCS SP Podemos
Support for 
More Political 
and Economic 
Integration
51 % 73 % 69 % 42 % 82 %
Would Talk  
Positively About 
the EU to Friends
44 % 62 % 35 % 42 % 70 %
Optimistic about 
the Future of 
the EU
18 % 51 % 38 % 35 % 58 %
Rightwing
Populist Parties RN AfD LN FvD PVV PiS Vox
Support for 
More Political 
and Economic 
Integration
23 % 22 % 60 % 17 % 31 % 43 % 44 %
Would Talk  
Positively About 
the EU to Friends
27 % 24 % 29 % 22 % 44 % 79 % 50 %
Optimistic about 
the Future of 
the EU
18 % 15 % 34 % 18 % 34 % 62 % 45 %
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EU27: What People Think about the EU by Leftwing to Rightwing Party Supporters
Personal sentiments about the state of the European Union. Answering with yes in percent.
Leftwing  
Populist Parties LFI Die Linke MVCS SP Podemos
The EU Will No 
Longer Exist 17 % 5 % 14 % 4 % 4 %
More Exits 
like UK 28 % 35 % 41 % 40 % 30 %
EU Will Remain 
the Same 16 % 13 % 14 % 16 % 35 %
Different Speeds 
of Integration 31 % 44 % 26 % 35 % 26 %
A United States 
of Europe 8 % 3 % 5 % 5 % 5 %
Rightwing
Populist Parties RN AfD LN FvD PVV PiS Vox
The EU Will No 
Longer Exist 19 % 23 % 16 % 19 % 6 % 10 % 9 %
More Exits 
like UK 48 % 47 % 42 % 48 % 41 % 35 % 40 %
EU Will Remain 
the Same 17 % 9 % 16 % 12 % 30 % 23 % 29 %
Different Speeds 
of Integration 9 % 14 % 22 % 18 % 21 % 30 % 19 %
A United States 
of Europe 7 % 7 % 4 % 3 % 2 % 2 % 3 %
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